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Abstract: We characterize a mechanism for reducing pollution emissions in which coun-
tries, acting non-cooperatively, commit to match each others’ abatement levels and may
subsequently engage in emissions quota trading. The mechanism leads to an eﬃcient level
of emissions, and if the matching abatements process includes a quota trading stage, the
marginal beneﬁts of emissions are also equalized across countries. Given equilibrium match-
ing rates, the initial allocation of emission quotas (before trading) reﬂects each country’s
marginal valuation for lower pollution relative to its marginal beneﬁt from emissions. These
results hold for any number of countries, in an environment where countries have diﬀerent
abatement technologies and diﬀerent beneﬁts from emissions, and even if the emissions of
countries are imperfect substitutes in each country’s damage function. In a dynamic two-
period setting, the mechanism achieves both intra-temporal and inter-temporal eﬃciency.
We extend the model by assuming that countries are voluntarily contributing to an inter-
national public good, in addition to undertaking pollution abatements, and ﬁnd that the
level of emissions may be eﬃcient even without any matching abatement commitments,
and the marginal beneﬁts of emissions may be equalized across countries even without
quota trading.
Keywords: Voluntary pollution abatement, matching commitments, emissions quota
trading; JEL classiﬁcation: H23, H41, H87
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International agreements on pollution reduction targets are diﬃcult to achieve and sustain
in the absence of a central authority with the ability to enforce the abatement objectives
of national governments. Cooperative initiatives also require that countries be able to
agree on the overall objectives of emissions reduction and on how abatement eﬀorts should
be distributed across countries. This is particularly challenging given that the costs and
beneﬁts of pollution abatement vary considerably across countries. Without cooperative
agreements, emission reductions rely essentially on the voluntary contributions of countries.
In this paper, we show that voluntary pollution abatement by countries behaving non-
cooperatively can lead to eﬃcient outcomes provided that countries can commit to match-
ing the abatement eﬀorts of each other at some announced rates. The eﬃciency of vol-
untary contributions to international public goods when countries can commit has been
established by Guttman (1978), Danziger and Schnytzer (1991), Varian (1994) and Boad-
way, Song and Tremblay (2007). We show how similar reasoning can be adapted to the
case of international pollution abatement when countries have diﬀerent abatement tech-
nologies and may be able to engage in emissions quota trading. Remarkably, we also ﬁnd
that eﬃciency can occur even in the absence of commitment provided that countries are
also contributing to an international public good.
Recently, a number of papers have proposed mechanisms for implementing eﬃcient con-
tributions by countries to international public goods, such as pollution abatement. In
particular, Gersbach and Winkler (2007) and Gerber and Wichardt (2009) have proposed
schemes in which countries make up-front payments to a neutral institution as a way of
pre-committing to contributions. The payments are eventually refunded, at least in part,
if countries provide their intended contributions. The neutral institution’s ability to deny
refunds induces countries to act according to prior commitments. In principle, these mech-
anisms can be designed to implement any desired emission reduction objectives, although
they require some prior cooperative agreement to establish such objectives, and to de-
cide how to distribute the surplus across countries. In contrast, we take the commitment
ability of countries as given, but focus on a non-cooperative mechanism that can emerge
1and induce full eﬃciency in emission abatement when countries are making commitments
voluntarily and are acting in their own self-interest.
Altemeyer-Bartscher, R¨ ubbelke and Sheshinski (2009) consider another form of commit-
ment mechanism whereby each of two countries voluntarily makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer
of a payment to the other country conditional on the tax rate that the latter imposes on a
polluting good. They show that such a mechanism can induce the eﬃcient level of pollu-
tion. While their mechanism is based on side-payments between countries, the mechanism
we characterize relies on matching abatement commitments and, crucially, may allow emis-
sions quota trading. Both mechanisms can lead to eﬃcient allocations, although they do
not generally result in the same distribution of net beneﬁts across countries. Moreover, as
Altemeyer-Bartscher, R¨ ubbelke and Sheshinski recognize, their mechanism does not easily
generalize to more than two countries, since any given country would receive take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀers from all other countries simultaneously.
Our static one-period base case without quota trading resembles the case analyzed by
Guttman and Schnytzer (1992) who demonstrate the existence of a Pareto eﬃcient equilib-
rium in a mechanism where two individuals are matching each others’ externality-producing
activities. The pollution reduction case that we study has some features that go beyond the
simple externality case. Countries have access to diﬀerent pollution abatement technolo-
gies, which gives rise to the issue of the optimal allocation of emissions across countries. In
this case, the possibility of emissions quota trading provides an instrument for achieving
that optimal allocation alongside the use of a matching mechanism to inﬂuence to aggre-
gate level of abatements. We also extend the mechanism both to a multi-country setting
and to a dynamic two-period setting where emissions in one period determine the initial
stock of pollution in the next period.
Speciﬁcally, the pollution abatement process we consider works as follows. Each country
simultaneously (and non-cooperatively) announces a rate at which it will match the abate-
ment eﬀorts of the other countries. Countries then choose their direct abatement eﬀorts
simultaneously, taking the previously announced matching rates as given. After these two
stages of decisions, countries are committed to achieving a total emissions quota equal to
2their business-as-usual emissions minus the sum of their direct and matching abatement
eﬀorts. However, these commitments may be contingent in the sense that once they are
determined, countries may trade emissions quotas at the competitively determined price.
The analysis shows that the subgame perfect equilibrium of this emission abatement pro-
cess is eﬃcient. The eﬃcient level of pollution abatement is achieved, and if the mechanism
allows for quota trading, the marginal beneﬁts of emissions are equalized across countries.
The equilibrium displays other interesting properties. For one, the eﬀective marginal cost
to a country from inducing an increase in world abatements is the same whether they do
so directly through their own abatements or indirectly through matching the other coun-
try’s abatements. For another, in equilibrium, a country’s total abatements, both direct
and matching, just equals its marginal valuation of pollution abatement times total world
abatements. Thus, the countries’ eﬀective costs of abatement are the analogs of Lindahl
prices in the context of this model.
As mentioned, the non-cooperative mechanism that we consider is easily applicable to a
setup with any number of countries. Under a matching rate mechanism, the simultaneous
oﬀers of several countries readily add up to an aggregate matching rate applying to the
abatement eﬀort of an individual country. We also consider a dynamic two-period extension
and ﬁnd that the mechanism achieves intra-temporal and inter-temporal eﬃciency: the
total level of emissions is eﬃcient as well as its allocation between periods. And, we extend
the model by adding an international public good provided by the voluntary contributions
of countries. If contributions to the public good are made after the pollution abatement
process, we ﬁnd that the level of emissions and their allocation across countries are eﬃcient
even in the absence of matching abatement commitments and quota trading.
In the next section, we describe the main features of the model. We then characterize
the abatement process equilibrium in a simple two-country case. Various extensions of
the basic model are considered in Section 4, while contributions to an international public
good are added in Section 5. In Section 6, we show that the mechanism leads to eﬃcient
levels of emissions even if countries’ emissions are imperfect substitutes in each countries’
damage function. Concluding remarks are provided in the last section.
32 The Basic Two-Country Model
There are two countries denoted by i,j = 1,2. In the absence of any abatement eﬀort, the
business-as-usual level of emissions by country i is equal to ei. Both countries can undertake
costly abatements which will reduce actual emissions. In the basic model, country i chooses
a level of direct abatements ai, as well as committing to match the direct abatement of
country j at a rate mi.1 Therefore, country i’s total choice of abatements equals Ai =
ai + miaj. In some extensions of the basic model, we allow for emissions quota trading.
In these cases, the initial choice of abatements Ai is contingent since countries can then
trade emission quotas at market price p. In these cases, we can interpret county i’s initial
choice of emissions ei−Ai as its pre-trade emissions quota. The number of emission quotas
purchased by country i is denoted by qi, where q1 = −q2. Given the number of quotas
traded, the actual emissions of country i are ei = ei−Ai+qi. Note that aggregate emissions
by both countries are equal to the sum of their initial commitments before quota trading.
The latter simply reallocates emissions from one country to another.
The beneﬁts of actual emissions to country i is given by the function Bi(ei), where B0
i > 0
and B00
i < 0.2 The damage to country i is a function of the total emissions of both
countries, Di(e1+e2), with D0
i > 0 and D00
i > 0. Hence, the emissions of both countries are
assumed to be perfect substitutes, although we later relax this assumption in an extension
of the basic model.
The analysis will characterize the equilibrium levels of abatement in a number of cases,
starting with the basic case where there are matching abatements but no emissions quota
trading. We then consider the various extensions of the basic model mentioned in the
Introduction.
1 In the real world, abatements ai will be chosen by private agents, and the government will
inﬂuence them indirectly by a tax or tradeable permit scheme. For simplicity, we suppress the
private sector from our analysis and let the government choose abatements directly. Nothing
of substance is lost by this simpliﬁcation.
2 The marginal beneﬁts of emissions can be viewed as the negative of a marginal cost of abatement
function, B0(e) = −C0(A). A cost of abatement function has been used by Roberts and Spence
(1976), for example.
4Before turning to the basic case without quota trading, it is useful to characterize the
social optimum. To do so, we solve a Pareto-optimizing problem whereby the emissions
of both countries are chosen to maximize the net beneﬁts of one country, say country 1,
subject to the constraint that the net beneﬁts of country 2 equals some ﬁxed level Π2:
max
{e1,e2}
B1(e1) − D1(e1 + e2) + λ

B2(e2) − D2(e1 + e2) − Π2












This condition is the analog of the Samuelson condition for public goods, but in the context
of a public bad. It says that eﬃcient emissions in each country are such that the sum of
the two countries’ ratios of marginal damages to marginal beneﬁts is equal to unity.
The social optimum just deﬁned is restrictive in the sense that the only instruments for
redistributing between countries are emissions e1 and e2. To understand the implications
of this, suppose we allow the possibility of a transfer T from country 2 to country 1, where
T R 0. The above Pareto optimizing problem then becomes:
max
{e1,e2,T}
B1(e1) − D1(e1 + e2) + T + λ

B2(e2) − D2(e1 + e2) − T − Π2





In eﬀect, while (1) characterizes the eﬃcient level of total emissions, (2) characterizes their
eﬃcient allocation across countries. We can think of the solutions to the latter problem
for various values of Π2 as tracing out the ﬁrst-best utility possibilities frontier, while
the solution to the problem without transfers traces out a restricted utility possibilities
frontier. The two would only coincide where T = 0 solves the latter problem. In the basic
model to which we turn next, it is the restrictive problem that is relevant. However, as we
shall see, outcomes on the ﬁrst-best frontier can be achieved in some of our extensions.





2, and would not be optimal. A world government could achieve the restricted
social optimum by imposing Pigouvian taxes on the emissions in each country at the tax
rates t1 = D0
2 and t2 = D0
1. In the absence of transfers, these tax rates would generally dif-
fer. If the world government could also make inter-country transfers, the optimal Pigouvian
tax would be uniform across countries.3 Our analysis explores commitment mechanisms as
a way of achieving eﬃciency in the absence of a world government.
In what follows, we focus on the case where the socially optimal abatements of the two
countries are both interior. That is, the levels of emissions e∗
1 and e∗
2 corresponding with
the solution to the social optimum satisfy 0 < e∗
1 < e1 and 0 < e∗
2 < e2.
3 Matching Abatements without Quota Trading
In this section, we examine the basic case where two countries can commit to matching
the abatement eﬀorts of each other, and where there is no quota trading. The timing
of decisions is the following. In Stage 1, both countries simultaneously choose the rate
mi at which they will match the direct abatements of the other country. Countries then
simultaneously choose direct abatement levels ai in Stage 2. We characterize the subgame
perfect equilibrium of this two-stage process by backward induction.4
Stage 2: Choosing Direct Abatements a1 and a2
Taking (m1,m2) as given from Stage 1, country 1 chooses a1 to solve the following:
max
{a1}
Π1 = B1 (e1 − a1 − m1a2) − D1

e1 − (1 + m2)a1 + e2 − (1 + m1)a2

The ﬁrst-order condition, assuming an interior solution, is:
F1(a1,a2,m1,m2) ≡ −B0
1(·) + (1 + m2)D0









3 This point is made by Sandmo (2006). He emphasizes the distinction between carbon prices in
high-and low-income countries when there are limited international transfers.
4 Multi-stage processes of matching contributions to public goods have been analyzed in Guttman
(1978), Danziger and Schnytzer (1991), Varian (1994) and Boadway, Song and Tremblay (2007),
among others.
6The solution to this ﬁrst-order condition is country 1’s reaction function a1(a2;m1,m2).
For any a2, country 1 will choose its level of abatements such that the ratio of marginal
damage to marginal beneﬁt equals the eﬀective cost at which it can increase world abate-
ments by one unit, 1/(1 + m2). Diﬀerentiating (3), we have:
F1
a1 = B00
1 − (1 + m2)2D00
1 < 0, F1
a2 = m1B00




1 − a2(1 + m2)D00
1 < 0, F1
m2 = −a1(1 + m2)D00
1 + D0
1 > < 0
(4)
The problem of country 2 is analogous. Its reaction function is a2(a1;m1,m2), and
expressions similar to (4) apply. The slopes of the two countries’ reaction curves are
da2/da1 = −F1
a1/F1
a2 < 0 for country 1 and the analog for country 2, −F2
a1/F2
a2 < 0.
The simultaneous solution to both reaction functions gives the Nash equilibrium abate-
ments as functions of matching rates, a1(m1,m2) and a2(m1,m2) (with some abuse of
notation). For an interior Nash equilibrium in abatements to be stable, the slope of coun-










that H > 0. Using (4) and its analog for country 2, we can derive




2 − (1 + m1)B00
1D00





Since the expression in the square brackets in (5) is positive, we have
H R 0 ⇐⇒ 1 − m1m2 R 0
We can characterize diﬀerent types of outcomes in Stage 2 with reference to the sign of H:
Case i) H > 0, m1m2 < 1
In this case, the Nash equilibrium, which we assume is interior, will be stable.
Case ii) H < 0, m1m2 > 1
An interior Nash equilibrium will be unstable, and any deviation from equilibrium would
tend to a stable corner equilibrium with either a1 = 0,a2 > 0 or a1 > 0,a2 = 0.
7Case iii) H = 0, m1m2 = 1
In this case, the slopes of the two reaction curves are identical. Moreover, using (4), the










1 − (1 + m2)2D00
1
m1B00





An analogous calculation for country 2 reveals that the slope of its reaction curve is the
same. Thus, when m1m2 = 1, reaction curves are linear and parallel. There are three
possible equilibria in this case, depending on the values of m1 and m2. First, country 2’s
reaction curve might be outside country 1’s as shown in the dotted lines in Figure 1. In
this case, only country 2 undertakes abatements. Alternatively, county 1’s reaction curve
is outside country 2’s so only the former abates. Finally, the two reaction curves could
overlap, in which case a1 and a2 are indeterminate.
The latter case where the reaction curves overlap will be of special interest, so it is worth
mentioning a couple of relevant properties. First, there will be unique values of m1 and m2
such that the reaction curves coincide.5 Second, since the Stage 2 reaction curves coincide,
direct abatements (a1,a2) are indeterminate. However, total abatements by each country
5 To see this, note that in an interior solution (including at the boundary), country 1’s reaction




















a1 > 0 at a1 = 0)
Analogous properties hold for country 2’s reaction curve. Consider an initial situation in which
which m1m2 = 1 and reaction curves coincide. Now suppose we ﬁrst increase m1 by a small
amount, holding m2 constant. The properties above and the expression for the slopes of reaction
curves imply that 1) the reaction curves become ﬂatter in the (a1-a2)–space, 2) the intercept
of country 1’s reaction curve is unchanged along the a1–axis, 3) the intercept of country 2’s
reaction curve along the a1–axis moves right, so the reaction curves are unambiguously further
apart, although the intercept of country 2’s reaction curve along the a2–axis can either go up or
down. Next, starting with these new reaction curves, consider decreasing m2 by a small amount,
holding m1 constant. 1) The reaction curves again become ﬂatter, 2) the intercept of country
2’s reaction curve is unchanged along the a2–axis, 3) the intercept of country 1’s reaction curve
along the a2–axis goes down so the reaction curves again go further apart unambiguously,
although the intercept of country 1’s reaction curve along the a1–axis can increase or decrease.
The opposite will occur if we increase m2 and decrease m1. These imply that there is only one
pair of m1 and m2 such that m1m2 = 1 and the two reaction curves coincide.
8are determinate. That is, all combinations of a1 and a2 along the common reaction curve
yield the same levels of total abatement A1 and A2.6 The implication is that net beneﬁts







e1 − A1 + e2 − A2

i = 1,2
Note ﬁnally that when m1m2 = 1, each country’s eﬀective costs of direct and matching
abatements are equal. To see this, note ﬁrst that the eﬀective cost to country 1 of increasing
world abatement by one unit through an increase in its direct abatement a1 is equal to
1/(1 + m2), as mentioned earlier. On the other hand, the eﬀective cost to country 1 of a
one unit increase in world abatement induced by an increase in the direct abatement of
country 2 is m1/(1 + m1).7 When m1m2 = 1, it follows that 1/(1 + m2) = m1/(1 + m1),
so the eﬀective costs of direct and matching abatements are equal. The same holds for
country 2.
Stage 1: Choosing Matching Rates m1 and m2
At this stage, both countries anticipate the subsequent Nash equilibrium choices of direct
abatements. Country 1 chooses its matching rate m1 to maximize its net beneﬁt, taking
as given m2 and taking account of the Nash equilibrium solution a1(m1,m2),a2(m1,m2).
Country 1’s net beneﬁt can be written as:
Π1 ≡ B1





e1 − (1 + m2)a1(m1,m2) + e2 − (1 + m1)a2(m1,m2)

6 Thus, along the common reaction curves, ∆a2/∆a1 = −(1 + m2)/(1 + m1). Since A1 =
a1 + m1a2 and using m1m2 = 1,







The same demonstration applies for A2.
7 To see this, note that since A = (1+m2)a1+(1+m1)a2, a change of a2 equal to ∆a2 = 1/(1+m1)
will cause an increase in A of ∆A = 1. The cost to country 1 will be m1∆a1 = m1/(1 + m1).























Assume ﬁrst an interior solution in abatements in Stage 2, so F1(·) = 0 and F2(·) = 0 by













































This implies that dΠ1/dm1 > 0 if m1m2 6= 1 and the Stage 2 equilibrium is interior. The
same holds for country 2.
Using this result and the characterization of Stage 2 above, it can be shown that the
subgame-perfect equilibrium will be such that m1m2 = 1 and the two reaction curves
coincide. As long as at least one country contributes in the absence of any matching
contributions, this Nash equilibrium in matching rates will be unique. The demonstration
is provided in the Appendix. As explained above, there will be unique values of m1 and
m2 for which m1m2 = 1 and reaction curves coincide, the values of a1 and a2 will be
indeterminate along the common reaction curve but total abatements, A1 and A2, will be
uniquely determined.
Properties of the Equilibrium
A few other properties of the equilibrium are noteworthy. First, the equilibrium is eﬃcient.
The two Stage 2 ﬁrst-order conditions together give:
D0
1 (e1 − A1 + e2 − A2)
B0
1 (e1 − A1)
+
D0
2 (e1 − A1 + e2 − A2)
B0








using m1m2 = 1 in the last step. This is condition (1) characterizing the eﬃcient levels of
emissions by the two countries derived in Section 2.
10Second, the direct cost at which country 1 can abate emissions, 1/(1+m2), which is equal
to D0
1/B0
1 by the ﬁrst-order condition in Stage 2, is the analog of a Lindahl price in the
context considered here: it is the price per unit of abatement that country 1 would be
willing to pay for the total abatements A1 +A2. To see this, simply note that the product
of this price and total world abatements equals the total direct and matching abatement
of country 1 (using m1 = 1/m2):
1
1 + m2
(A1 + A2) =





a2 = a1 + m1a2 = A1
Thus, country 1’s direct and matching abatements A1 equals its marginal valuation for
reduced pollution relative to its marginal valuation of the beneﬁts of emissions, D0
1/B0
1,
applied to the world’s total abatements, (A1+A2). The same applies for country 2. Thus,
the total abatement each country makes can be seen as its quasi-Lindahl abatement eﬀort.8
Finally, in equilibrium, countries 1 and 2 are indiﬀerent between making direct abatements
and matching abatements. As explained earlier, the eﬀective cost to country 1 of direct
abatements is 1/(1+m2), whereas its eﬀective cost of matching abatements is m1/(1+m1).
When m1m2 = 1, 1/(1 + m2) = m1/(1 + m1) and 1/(1 + m1) = m2/(1 + m2). Thus,
the cost to either country of reducing the world’s pollution by one unit through direct
abatement eﬀorts or through matching abatement eﬀorts are equal. If country 1 were
to increase its matching rate, starting from an equilibrium with m1m2 = 1, it would be
reducing emissions indirectly at a cost higher than the cost at which it can reduce emissions
directly. The same would apply for country 2. Therefore, neither country would want to
increase their matching rate beyond m1m2 = 1. By the same token, when m1m2 < 1,
1/(1 + m2) > m1/(1 + m1). It will be cheaper for country 1 to match the abatement of
country 2 than to reduce emissions through its own direct abatements, so it will increase
m1. The same holds for country 2.
8 Danziger and Schnytzer (1991) have shown that the Lindahl equilibrium in a public good con-
tributions game can be implemented through a process where players can voluntarily subsidize
the contributions of each other. Recently, Nishimura (2008) characterized the properties of the
Lindahl equilibrium in the context of international emissions reduction, and examined diﬀerent
implementation mechanisms.
11The main results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Assuming a1 > 0 and/or a2 > 0 when m1 = m2 = 0, the subgame perfect
equilibrium of the abatement process is unique and has the following properties:
i. Direct abatements (a1,a2) are indeterminate, but matching rates (m1,m2) and total
abatements (A1,A2) are uniquely determined;
ii. Matching rates satisfy m1m2 = 1 and countries are indiﬀerent between direct and
indirect contributions to abatements;
iii. The levels of emissions are Pareto eﬃcient; and
iv. The eﬀective cost of abatement faced by each country is the analog of a Lindahl price.
4 Extensions to the Basic Case
In this section, we consider three extensions to the basic case. First, we investigate the
consequences of adding emissions quota trading. Then, we extend our model to a setting
with more than two countries. Finally, we characterize the equilibrium of the abatement
process in a dynamic two-period setting. In each case, the analysis is a straightforward
extension of the basic case, so detailed analysis is not necessary.
4.1 The Mechanism with Emissions Quota Trading
With quota trading, the abatement mechanism involves three stages. The matching rates
and the direct abatements chosen in the ﬁrst two stages determine the emission quotas
to which countries are committed. In the third stage, countries can trade these quotas
at the equilibrium price, which we assume is competitively determined.9 Note that in
the absence of a central government with the authority to administer a quota trading
system, the three-stage abatement process with quota trading requires a stronger form of
commitment from countries than the two-stage process of the previous section. Again, we
9 Although we are considering a two-country model, we assume that countries take the price of
quotas as given so as to abstract from issues of market power which is not the focus of our
analysis. The model is extended to a multi-country setting in the next section.
12characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction, starting with Stage
3.
Stage 3: Emissions Quota Trading
Direct abatements (a1,a2) and matching rates (m1,m2), and therefore total abatement
commitments (A1,A2), have been determined in the previous two stages. The demand for
emission quotas by country 1 at price p solves (assuming an interior solution and assuming
that both countries are price-takers):
max
{q1}
B1(e1 − A1 + q1) − pq1
where, recall, A1 = a1 + m1a2. Since the total level of emission abatements for the two
countries is ﬁxed, the damage function can be left out of the problem. The ﬁrst-order
condition to this problem gives B0
1(e1 − A1 + q1) = p, whose solution is the demand for
emissions quotas, q1(p,A1). Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order condition B0













Similarly, the demand for quotas by country 2 satisﬁes B0
2(e2−A2+q2) = p and is denoted
by q2(p,A2). In equilibrium, q1(p,A1) + q2(p,A2) = 0, and the price satisﬁes
p(A1,A2) = B0
1(e1 − A1 + q1) = B0
2(e2 − A2 + q2)
Therefore, quota trading leads to an equalization of the marginal beneﬁts of emissions,
which is condition (2) for an eﬃcient allocation of abatements across countries.
Stage 2: Choosing Direct Abatements a1 and a2
We assume that countries correctly anticipate the price of quotas in Stage 3 and take it
as given when making their abatement commitments. Given (m1,m2) from Stage 1, the









e1 + e2 − A1 − A2

− pq1(p,A1)
13The ﬁrst-order condition, using p = B0




















Condition (11) has the same form as condition (3) characterizing the choice of direct
abatement in the previous case without quota trading. Its solution gives country 1’s
reaction function, a1(a2;m1,m2), and an analogous derivation for country 2 gives F2(·)
and a2(ai;m1,m2).
In an interior solution (including at the boundary), diﬀerentiating F1(·) and F2(·) and












Thus, the reaction curves for the two countries are linear and their slopes in (a1,a2)−space
are the same regardless of the values of m1 and m2. That is, Figure 1 applies for all values
of m1 and m2. The fact that reaction curves are parallel for any matching rates implies
that either there will be a corner solution in Stage 2, or the curves will overlap in the
interior so the solution is indeterminate.
Stage 1: Choosing Matching Rates m1 and m2
In Stage 1, both countries simultaneously choose their matching rates, m1 and m2, antic-
ipating the outcomes of Stages 2 and 3. The equilibrium has the same form as in the case
without quota trading, so there is no need to go through its derivation in detail. Equilib-
rium matching rates will be such that m1m2 = 1 and Stage 2 reaction curves will coincide.
In contrast to the case without quota trading, since Stage 2 reaction curves are parallel for
any set of matching rates in this case, the equilibrium in direct abatements will be a corner
solution whenever the reaction curves do not coincide. However, it is straightforward to
show that if either m1m2 < 1 or m1m2 > 1, countries would have incentives to change
their matching rates in ways that would cause the Stage 2 reaction curves to move closer
14together until they coincide and m1m2 = 1. The demonstration that such matching rates
constitute an equilibrium in the presence of a quota trading system is provided in the
Appendix.
The equilibrium has all the properties of the equilibrium without quota trading. In partic-





2 = 1, so the levels of emissions are Pareto eﬃcient. However, with
quota trading, the allocation of emissions across countries is also such that the marginal
beneﬁts of emissions are equalized, B0
2 = B0
1, which does not necessarily hold in the ab-
sence of quota trading. In terms of our discussion of the social optimum earlier, quota
trading combined with matching abatement commitments results in an allocation along
the ﬁrst-best utility possibilities frontier, unlike with matching abatements in the absence
of quota trading.
Hence, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2. With emissions quota trading, the equilibrium of the abatement process




4.2 The Mechanism with More than Two Countries
In this section, we show that all the results of the basic two-country model with quota
trading can be generalized to the case where there are more than two countries. To do
so, let us now assume that there are n countries denoted by i,j = 1,...,n, and let mij be
the matching rate oﬀered by country i on the direct abatement commitment of country j.
Thus, countries can commit to matching the direct abatements of all other countries at
diﬀerent rates. As in the two-country case, countries simultaneously choose their matching
rates in Stage 1, then set their direct abatement commitments in Stage 2. Finally, countries
trade emission quotas in Stage 3.
Stage 3: Emissions Quota Trading
At this stage, the total abatement commitment of country i is Ai = ai +
Pn
j=1 mijaj.
15The demand for emission quotas by country i maximizes Bi (ei − Ai + qi)−pqi. The ﬁrst-
order condition is B0
i (ei − Ai + qi) = p, and the solution is country i’s demand for emission
quotas qi(p,Ai), for i,j = 1,...,n and i 6= j. In equilibrium,
P
i qi(p,Ai) = 0, and the
price is such that p(Ai,...,An) = B0
i(ei − Ai + qi) for all i. Quota trading therefore leads
to an equalization of the marginal beneﬁts of emissions across all n countries.
Stage 2: Choosing Direct Abatements ai
Matching rates are determined at this stage, and all countries take the price of quotas as
given. The direct abatement commitment of country i solves the following:
max
{ai}






The ﬁrst-order condition, using p = B0





















The eﬀective cost at which country i can increase world abatements by one unit depends
on the total rate at which its direct abatement will be matched by all other countries.
Country i chooses ai to equalize this eﬀective cost to the ratio of marginal damages and
marginal beneﬁts of emissions.
Stage 1: Choosing Matching Rates mij
The equilibrium matching rates turn out to satisfy similar properties as in the two-country
case. In fact, with n countries, matching rates are such that mijmji = 1 and mkimijmjk =
1 (or equivalently mkimij = mkj). Since the equilibrium is analogous to that in the two-
country case, we need not go through its full derivation. We show in the Appendix that a
set of matching rates satisfying these conditions constitute an equilibrium in Stage 1.
The other properties of the equilibrium matching rates derived in the two-country case
apply here as well. In particular, with matching rates satisfying mijmji = 1 and















Thus, equilibrium abatements are eﬃcient and the marginal beneﬁts of emissions are equal-
ized across all countries.
The total abatements of each country are again quasi-Lindahl abatement eﬀorts. To see
this, note that country i’s quasi-Lindahl price D0
i/B0
i is equal to 1/(1+
Pn
j6=i mji) by (12).
Using Ai = ai +
Pn
j=1 mijaj, mijmji = 1 and mkimij = mkj, country i’s quasi-Lindahl
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Thus, country i’s marginal rate of substitution, 1/(1+
Pn




j, equals its total abatement before quota trading, A∗
i.
Finally, when mijmji = 1 and mkimij = mkj, 1/(1+
Pn
j6=i mji) = mik/(1+
Pn
j6=k mjk) for
all i and k. Each country faces equal direct and indirect costs of reducing the world’s emis-
sions by one unit. Each country is therefore indiﬀerent between making direct abatements
or matching abatements.
The analysis of this section leads to the following:
Proposition 3. When there are n countries that can commit to matching the abatement
eﬀorts of each other at country-speciﬁc rates, and emissions quota trading exists, the equi-
librium matching rates satisfy mijmji = 1 and mkimijmjk = 1 for i,j,k = 1,...,n, parts i,
iii and iv of Proposition 1 hold, and the marginal beneﬁts of emissions are equalized across
all n countries.
4.3 A Two-Period Model
In this section, we extend the analysis to a two-period setting and show that the three-
stage abatement process can induce full eﬃciency even in a dynamic context where current
emissions increase the stock of pollution that will exist in the future. For simplicity,
17we return to the two-country case. We assume that, in each period, countries can oﬀer
to match each other’s abatement commitments in the current period before engaging in
emissions quota trading. Matching rates and direct abatement commitments determine
the number of period-speciﬁc emission quotas that each country holds. Trading takes
place in each period and countries are not permitted to transfer emission quotas across
periods. Therefore, the three-stage process of the one-period model is undertaken in each
period, and in the ﬁrst period, both countries anticipate the impact of their decisions on
the second-period equilibrium.
In what follows, superscripts will denote time periods and subscripts will denote countries.
We normalize the initial stock of pollution to S0. In period 1, the actual emissions of
country 1 and country 2 are e1
1 and e1
2, respectively, while the initial stock S0 decays at
the rate γ, with 0 < γ < 1. Therefore, the stock of pollution at the end of period 1 is:
S1 = (1 − γ)S0 + e1
1 + e1
2
Similarly, the stock of pollution at the end of period 2 is:
S2 = (1 − γ)S1 + e2
1 + e2
2 = (1 − γ)








The levels of emissions in the absence of any abatements are assumed to be constant in both
periods and equal to e1 and e2. Before characterizing the equilibrium of the abatement
process, let us brieﬂy examine the social optimum in this two-period case.
The Social Optimum
The socially eﬃcient levels of emissions of each country in each period can be characterized
by maximizing the discounted sum of country 1’s beneﬁts net of damages over both periods,
subject to the constraint that the discounted sum of country 2’s net beneﬁts equals some
given level Π2. As in Section 2, we allow lump-sum transfer of T from country 2 to country
1 in order to characterize eﬃcient points along the ﬁrst-best utility possibilities frontier.
The transfer is assumed to take place in the ﬁrst period, although it makes no diﬀerence.













2) − D2(S1) − T + δB2(e2
2) − δD2(S2) − Π
2i
where δ is the common discount factor and S1 and S2 are given by the expressions deﬁned




































In period 2, eﬃcient emissions are such the sum of the ratios of marginal damages to
marginal beneﬁts of the two countries is equal to one. Eﬃcient emissions in period 1
are such that the sum of the two countries ratios of period 1 marginal damages plus the
discounted and decay-adjusted period 2 marginal damages, over period 1 marginal beneﬁts,
is equal to one. As well, marginal beneﬁts of emissions are equalized across countries in
each period.
The Two-Period Equilibrium
In period 1, countries 1 and 2 oﬀer matching rates m1
1 and m1
2 and make direct abatement
commitments a1
1 and a1
2, and similarly in period 2. Their actual emissions are:
e1





















These actual emissions result in stocks of pollution in each period given by:
S1 ≡ (1 − γ)S0 + e1
1 + e1
2 = (1 − γ)S0 + (e1 − a1
1 − m1
1a1




S2 ≡ (1 − γ)S1 + e2
1 + e2


















We characterize the two-period equilibrium by backward induction starting with period 2.
19Period 2





2) will only aﬀect the period 2 equilibrium through their eﬀects on the
pollution stock at the end of the ﬁrst period, S1. It is straightforward to see that, for
a given level of S1, the three-stage abatement process that countries face in period 2 is
essentially the same as in the basic one-period case, and the equilibrium will have the same
characteristics. In particular, the equilibrium in period 2 will be fully eﬃcient, given the
pollution stock S1. Denote the eﬃcient total abatements in the second period by A2∗
1 and
A2∗








1. The demand for quotas by countries
1 and 2 satisfy B0
1(e1 − A2∗
1 + q2
1) = p2 and B0
2(e2 − A2∗
2 + q2





j = 0 for i,j = 1,2, and can be written as q2
1(p2,A2∗





2(·) = 0 and p2(A2∗
1 ,A2∗







Given that the outcome in period 2 is fully eﬃcient, the marginal eﬀect of the period 1
pollution stock on total abatements in period 2 can be derived from the condition that

















(1 − γ)S1 + e1 − A2∗











(1 − γ)S1 + e1 − A2∗








Diﬀerentiating the above and using ∂q2
i /∂A2
i = 1 and ∂q2
i /∂A2


































= 1 − γ
Consequently, the change in the net beneﬁt of country 1 in period 2 resulting from a change




1) − D1(S2) − p2q2
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20A similar expression holds for country 2. An increase in the stock of pollution in period
1, of which a proportion (1 − γ) will remain in period 2, will induce an increase in the
total abatement of country 1 in period 2, reducing the period 2 net beneﬁt of country 1 by










2(S1) denote the second period net
beneﬁts of countries 1 and 2, respectively.
Period 1
Since quota trading in the third stage does not aﬀect the stock of pollution at the end of
period 1, the quota trading process has no impact on the second period. Therefore, the
quota trading equilibrium has the same properties as in the static one-period case, and
there is no need to characterize it again.
In Stage 2, country 1 chooses its direct abatement a1
1, taking matching rates (m1
1,m1
2) and
country 2’s direct abatement a1
2 as given and anticipating the eﬀect of a1
1 on the second-
period equilibrium, in order to maximize the discounted sum of its net beneﬁts over both





1) − D1(S1) − p1q1
1 + δΠ2
1(S1)
for which the ﬁrst-order condition is
F(·) ≡ −B0
1(e1
1) + (1 + m1
2)D0
































The second term in the expression above is the discounted reduction in country 1’s second-
period net beneﬁts resulting from higher ﬁrst-period pollution as a ratio of the marginal
beneﬁt of ﬁrst period emissions. Country 1 chooses its level of direct abatement such
that the sum of this discounted cost and of the ratio of ﬁrst-period marginal damages
to marginal beneﬁts of emissions equals the eﬀective cost to country 1 of reducing world
21emissions by one unit, given that its own abatements are matched at the rate m1
2 by
country 2. The solution to this condition gives the reaction function of country 1, which















The analog holds for country 2. Hence, as in the one-period case, reaction curves are linear
and parallel in the (a1,a2)–space for any matching rates (m1
1,m1
2). As in the one -period
model, we could again show that the equilibrium matching rates in Stage 1 are such that
m1
1m1
2 = 1, and that the subgame perfect equilibrium has same properties as in the one-
period case. Hence, the equilibrium replicates the social optimum derived earlier, so both
intra-temporal eﬃciency and inter-temporal eﬃciency are achieved. Total emissions are
eﬃcient, and they are eﬃciently allocated across periods.
The results of this section are summarized below.
Proposition 4. In a two-period setting where both countries can commit to match each
others abatements and engage in emissions quota trading in both periods, the subgame
perfect equilibrium is such that:
i. The properties listed in Proposition 1 apply in each period;
ii. The marginal beneﬁts of emissions are equalized across countries in both periods;
iii. Inter-temporal eﬃciency is achieved: emissions are eﬃciently allocated across periods.
5 Adding Contributions to an International Public Good
In this section, we explore how the introduction of an international public good provided
through the voluntary contributions of countries will aﬀect the pollution abatement pro-
cess. For ease of exposition, we return to the basic one-period two-country case. Let the
level of provision of the international public good be denoted by G and the contributions
of each country by g1 and g2. Contributions are assumed to be perfect substitutes, so
G = g1 + g2.
Utility in country i is ui(G,xi), where xi is private consumption net of the beneﬁts and
22damages of emissions. Utility is increasing and quasi-concave in both arguments. Both G
and xi are assumed to be normal, and the latter is given by
xi = wi − gi + Bi





e1 − (1 + m2)a1 + e2 − (1 + m1)a2

− pqi
where wi is the initial endowment of country i. This formulation assumes that the beneﬁts
of emissions, net of damages, as well as the revenues from emissions quota trading are
perfect substitutes for consumption.
The timing of decisions is important. We assume that countries choose their level of
pollution abatement ﬁrst, and then contribute to the international public good. With this
order of decisions, we ﬁnd that even without matching commitments and quota trading, the
levels of emissions are eﬃcient and the marginal beneﬁts of emissions are equalized across
countries. Although we will not go through the analysis of the case where contributions to
the public good are determined ﬁrst, it is straightforward to show that, in this case, the
equilibrium of the abatement process will only be eﬃcient if countries are making matching
rate commitments and are engaging in emission quota trading, as in the basic case without
contributions to a public good.
As will become apparent, with contributions to the public good determined after abatement
decisions, commitments to matching abatements and emission quota trading turn out to
be irrelevant so we can ignore them. The sequence of decisions is then simply as follows. In
Stage 1, the two countries simultaneously choose emission abatements ai. Both countries
then set their contributions to the international public good gi in Stage 2. We consider
Stage 2 ﬁrst.
Stage 2: Choosing Contributions to the International Public Good gi
At the beginning of this stage, the wealth of the two countries are w1 + B1(e1 − a1) −
D1(e1 − a1 + e2 − a2) and w2 + B2(e2 − a2) − D2(e1 − a1 + e2 − a2), given the levels of
abatements (a1,a2) chosen in the previous stage. Country i chooses its contribution to
maximize ui(g1+g2,wi−gi+Bi(·)−Di(·)), taking the contribution of the other country as
given. Assuming an interior solution to public good contributions, gi is such that ui
G/ui
x =





x = 1. More importantly, the well-known Neutrality Theorem
(Shibata, 1971; Warr, 1983; Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian, 1986) implies that the net
private consumptions of the two countries x1 and x2 and the level of public good provision
G will depend only on aggregate wealth, and not on its distribution across the two countries.
Aggregate wealth here is w1 + w2 + I, where
I ≡ B1(e1 − a1) − D1(e1 − a1 + e2 − a2) + B2(e2 − a2) − D2(e1 − a1 + e2 − a2)
Thus, the two countries’ utilities after the second stage can be written as u1[G(I),x1(I)]
and u2[G(I),x2(I)], since w1+w2 is constant. Given that G, x1, and x2 are normal goods,
and that utilities are increasing in both arguments, maximizing I will also maximize the
utility of each country. As a result, the objectives of the two countries in Stage 1 will be
perfectly aligned.
Stage 1: Choosing Emission Abatements ai
In this stage, the countries choose their abatement eﬀorts, anticipating the outcome
of Stage 2. The problem of country i consists in choosing ai, given aj, to maximize
ui[G(I),xi(I)], and the ﬁrst-order condition implies that
−B0
i(ei − ai) + D0
i(e1 − a1 + e2 − a2) + D0
j(e1 − a1 + e2 − a2) = 0, i,j = 1,2
It is immediately clear that the ﬁrst-order conditions for the two countries taken together





2 = 1, as well as the condition that B0
1 = B0
2. Remarkably, the equilibrium
is such that the levels of emissions are eﬃcient and the marginal beneﬁts of emissions are
equalized across countries, despite the fact that countries do not commit to match each
other’s abatements and there is no emission quota trading. Moreover, it can readily be
shown that even if countries are able to commit to matching the abatement eﬀorts of each
other, they cannot derive any gain from making such commitments.
The main results of this section are stated below.
24Proposition 5. If countries make voluntary contributions to pollution abatement and then
contribute voluntarily to an international public good, the equilibrium has the following
properties:
i. If contributions to the public good are strictly positive for both countries, the levels
of emissions are eﬃcient and the marginal beneﬁts of emissions are equalized across
countries without any matching rate commitments and quota trading;
ii. Countries cannot gain by oﬀering strictly positive matching rates;
ii. Contributions to the public good are ineﬃcient.
6 Imperfect Substitutability of Emissions in Damage Functions
In this section, we show that the matching mechanism may also achieve eﬃciency in
abatements even if the emissions of each country are not perfect substitutes in the dam-
age functions. To do so, we go back to the basic setting of Section 3, but assume that
the damage function of country i is given by Di(e1,e2). We ﬁrst characterize the social
optimum in this case.
The Social Optimum
Eﬃcient emissions will solve the following Pareto optimization problem:
max
{e1,e2}
B1(e1) − D1(e1,e2) + λ

B2(e2) − D2(e1,e2) − Π2





















The last term on the left side of the condition above will be negative if countries suﬀer
higher marginal damages from their own emissions than from the emissions of the other
country, and will tend to zero as emissions become perfect substitutes.
25The Decentralized Equilibrium
In Stage 2, each country chooses its level of abatements, taking matching rates as given.
The problem of country 1 is the following:
max
{a1}
Π1 = B1(e1 − a1 − m1a2) − D1(e1 − a1 − m1a2,e2 − a2 − m2a1)
The ﬁrst-order condition is
F1 ≡ −B1
1(e1 − A1) + D1
1(e1 − A1,e2 − A2) + m2D1
2(e1 − A1,e2 − A2) = 0 (14)
The problem of country 2 is analogous. In an interior solution (including at the boundary),



































Therefore, the slopes of the two reaction curves in (a1,a2)−space are the same when
m1m2 = 1. As in the basic model analyzed in Section 3, matching rates for which Stage
2 reaction curves coincide and m1m2 = 1 will constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium,
provided that
H R 0 ⇐⇒ 1 − m1m2 R 0.
The condition under which this will hold is derived in the Appendix.
We can readily verify that, when m1m2 = 1 and reaction curves coincide, the ﬁrst-order
conditions from the Stage 2 problems of both countries together yield condition (13) char-
acterizing the Pareto eﬃcient levels of emissions. Moreover, the properties of the subgame
26perfect equilibrium derived in Section 3 will all apply in the current case where emissions
are imperfect substitutes in the damage functions.
7 Concluding Remarks
Our purpose in this paper has been to characterize a process of pollution emissions re-
duction in which countries can commit to match each others’ abatement eﬀorts and may
subsequently engage in emissions quota trading. The mechanism that we considered is
non-cooperative in the sense that each country, acting in its own self-interest, voluntarily
oﬀers to match the emission abatements of the other country’s at some announced rates,
anticipating the subsequent abatement equilibrium and the outcome of emissions quota
trading. The analysis has shown that this mechanism leads to an eﬃcient outcome. The
level of emissions is eﬃcient, and quota trading leads to an equalization of the marginal
beneﬁts of emissions across countries. This result holds independently of the number of
countries involved, and in an environment where countries have diﬀerent abatement tech-
nologies as well as diﬀerent beneﬁts from emissions. Eﬃcient levels of emissions also occur
even if countries’ emissions are imperfect substitutes in the damage function of each coun-
try. In a dynamic setting where the quality of the environment depends on cumulative
emissions over two periods, the mechanism is found to achieve both intra-temporal and
inter-temporal eﬃciency.
The mechanism also has appealing distributional implications. The initial allocation of
emission quotas across countries (before trading) emerges endogenously without central
coordination and reﬂects each country’s net marginal beneﬁts from reducing pollution.
This result also implies that all countries will ﬁnd it in their own interest to participate.
Countries with relatively low net marginal valuations for pollution reduction will face
relatively low eﬀective costs of abatement, given the set of equilibrium matching rates.
We extended the model by considering the case where countries are voluntarily contribut-
ing to an international public good in addition to undertaking pollution abatement. We
found that if public good contributions are determined after abatement eﬀorts, the level
of emissions is eﬃcient even in the absence of any matching abatement commitments. In
27fact, the incentive for countries to match the abatements of each other vanishes entirely.
Moreover, the marginal beneﬁts of emissions are equalized across countries even in the
absence of emissions quota trading.
Throughout, our analysis has assumed that all countries were able to commit to match the
other countries’ abatements. It would be interesting to extend the analysis to characterize
the pollution abatement process when only a subset of countries are able to commit. In this
case, diﬀerent forms of commitment could emerge as well as diﬀerent distributions of the
gains from achieving more eﬃcient allocations. What determines the commitment ability
of countries remains an open question. The recent papers of Gersbach and Winkler (2007)
and Gerber and Wichardt (2009) suggest potential mechanisms to address that issue.
28Appendix
Equilibrium Matching Rates in the Two-Country Case
We show here that the subgame-perfect equilibrium in the basic two-country case will be
such that m1m2 = 1 and the two stage 2 reaction curves coincide. We consider separately
outcomes with m1m2 <,>,= 1, in each case allowing for both corner and interior solutions
in stage 2. When corner solutions apply, we consider the case where country 2’s reaction
curve is outside 1’s so a2 > 0,a1 = 0, with D0
2/B0
2 = 1/(1+m1) and D0
1/B0
1 < 1/(1+m2).
It is apparent that the same results extend to the case where a1 > 0,a2 = 0.
Case i) m1m2 < 1
If the stage 2 equilibrium is interior, m1m2 < 1 implies that H > 0 by (5). By (8), both
countries will want to increase m1 so this cannot be an equilibrium.
Suppose the equilibrium is at a corner with a2 > 0,a1 = 0. There is no cost to country 2 of
increasing m2 until country 1’s stage 2 ﬁrst-order condition is just binding. At this point
we have an interior solution. If this occurs while m1m2 < 1, both countries will want to
increase mi. Thus, m1m2 < 1 cannot be an equilibrium. If country 1’s stage 2 ﬁrst-order
condition does not bind before m1m2 > 1, then the outcome falls into Case ii) below.
Case ii) m1m2 > 1
If the stage 2 equilibrium is interior, m1m2 > 1 implies that H < 0 by (5), so again
both countries will want to increase mi by (8). Note that, since interior stage 2 equilibria
are unstable, an increase in either matching rate will lead to a stable corner solution in
which only one country commits to ai > 0. Therefore, an interior stage 2 equilibrium with
m1m2 > 1 cannot occur.
Suppose the equilibrium is at a corner with a2 > 0,a1 = 0. Then, D0
1/B0
1 < 1/(1 + m2) <
m1/(1 + m1), where the latter inequality follows from m1m2 > 1. Country 1 wants to
reduce abatements, and since it cannot do so directly, it will do so indirectly by decreasing
m1. Formally, abatements are determined by the ﬁrst-order condition on country 2’s choice
of a2, given m1. Using A = (1 + m1)a2, we can write this as D0
2(e1 + e2 − A)/B0
2(e2 −




(1 + m1)B0 − AB00
(1 + m1)2D00 − (1 + m1)B00 > 0
Country 1’s net beneﬁt can be written in terms of A as Π1 = B1(e1 − m1A/(1 + m1)) −

















(1 + m1)2 < 0
since as we mentioned D0
1/B0
1 < m1/(1 + m1). Therefore, country 1 will want to reduce
m1 so this cannot be an equilibrium.
Case iii) m1m2 = 1
Begin with the case where there is a corner solution with a2 > 0,a1 = 0. Using m1m2 =
1, we have D0
1/B0
1 < 1/(1 + m2) = m1/(1 + m1). Country 1 would like to reduce its
contribution, and can do so only by decreasing m1. Using the same argument as in Case
ii) above, a reduction in m1 when country 2 is the only contributor will reduce A and
increase Π1. Speciﬁcally, the above expression again yields dΠ1/dm1 < 0 since D0
1/B0
1 <
m1/(1 + m1). Thus, this cannot be an equilibrium.
Finally, consider the case where reaction curves overlap with m1m2 = 1. We can show
that neither country will want to change its matching rate. Suppose ﬁrst that country
1 increases m1 by a small amount. Country 2’s reaction curve will then be everywhere
outside that of country 1, so a1 = 0,a2 > 0. This is so because, ﬁrst, from (4) and similar
expressions for country 2, the a1−intercept of country 1’s reaction curve does not change
(since da1/dm1|F 1=0 = 0 at a2 = 0), while the a1−intercept of country 2’s reaction curve
increases (since da2/dm1|F 2=0 > 0 at a2 = 0). Second, with m1m2 > 1, at any interior
solution the slope of 2’s reaction curve is steeper than that of 1’s, because H < 0 in (5)
and an interior solution is unstable. Therefore, given that 2’s intercept on the horizontal
axis is greater than 1’s, the reaction curves cannot cross in the interior (even though the
reaction curves are no longer linear).
Next, we can show in three small steps that country 1 is worse oﬀ than before the deviation.
First, to compare country 1’s payoﬀs before and after the unilateral increase in m1, we
30can think of country 1 as starting from the corner where a1 = 0, a2 > 0, m1m2 = 1 and
the reaction curves overlap and increasing its matching rate by a small amount. This is
because, when m1m2 = 1 and the reaction curves overlap, each combination of a1 and a2
along the common reaction curve yields the same payoﬀ to a country, as we have shown
before, and it does not matter for the purpose of welfare comparison which combination
we choose as a reference. At this corner allocation, to examine the eﬀect of an increase in
m1 on a2, we can use only country 2’s ﬁrst-order condition to do comparative statics: a1
is already zero in this corner allocation, where F1 = 0 just holds, and a1 remains zero as
m1 increases and F1 becomes negative; however, a2 is always positive and F2 = 0 always
holds as m1 increases. In other words, at the corner where a1 = 0, a2 > 0, m1m2 = 1
and the reaction curves overlap, and where country 1 is considering an increase in m1, m1
already has no eﬀect on a1.
Second, as we showed in the corner equilibrium under Case ii) above, total abatements
rise with m1: dA/dm1 > 1.
Third, country 1 is made worse oﬀ from an increase in m1 starting at m1m2 = 1 and
a1 = 0. As above, country 1’s net beneﬁt can be written, using m1a2 = Am1/(1 + m1) as
Π1 = B1(e1 − m1A/(1 + m1)) − D1(e1 + e2 − A). Diﬀerentiating with respect to m1, we

















(1 + m1)2 = −B0
1
A
(1 + m1)2 < 0
since B0
1/(1 + m2) = D0
1 at the starting point. Therefore, an upward deviation makes
country 1 worse oﬀ.
Finally, consider a reduction in m1 by country 1. First, note that by reasoning similar
to the above, country 2’s reaction curve will be everywhere inside that of country 1, so
a1 > 0,a2 = 0 after a downward deviation. To see this, note that with m1m2 < 1,
at any interior solution the slope of 2’s reaction curve is ﬂatter than that of country 1.
Therefore, given that 2’s intercept on the horizontal axis is smaller than 1’s, the reaction
curves cannot cross in the interior (even though they are nonlinear). After the deviation,
country 1’s direct abatement remains the same, since the a1-intercept of its reaction curve
31does not change. Country 1’s total abatement A1 = a1 and the world’s total abatement
A = (1 + m2)a1 are the same as before. Thus, country 1 is just as well oﬀ as before the
deviation.
Therefore, country 1 has no incentive to change m1 starting from an allocation with
m1m2 = 1 and overlapping Stage 2 reaction curves. The same will apply for country
2. The allocation is therefore an equilibrium. Since there are unique values on m1 and m2
for which m1m2 = 1 and the reaction curves overlap, as explained in the characterization
of Stage 2 in Section 3, the equilibrium is unique.
Equilibrium Matching Rates with Quota Trading
Analogously to the basic setting without quota trading, we now show that matching rates
for which m1m2 = 1 and reaction curves coincide also constitute an equilibrium in the
presence of a quota trading system. To see this, consider ﬁrst a small increase in m1 starting
with m1m2 = 1 and overlapping reaction curves. By diﬀerentiating (11) and the analogous
condition for country 2, the a1-intercept of country 1’s reaction curve remains unchanged,
since da1/dm1|F 1=0 = −F1
m1/F1
a1 = −a2/(1 + m1) which is equal to zero at a2 = 0, and the
a1-intercept of country 2’s reaction curve moves right, since da2/dm1|F 2=0 = −F2
m1/F2
a2 =




a2 > 0 at a2 = 0). Given that the reaction curves
remain parallel, country 2’s reaction curve necessarily moves outside that of country 1.
As in the case without quota trading, when m1m2 = 1, each country’s net beneﬁt is the
same for any combination of a1 and a2 along the common reaction curve. Therefore, we can
assume that we are initially at an allocation with a1 = 0 and a2 > 0, so that A = (1+m1)a2
and abatements are determined by country 2’s Stage 2 ﬁrst-order condition. In this case,










e1 + e2 − A

− pq1(p,A1)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to m1, using ∂q1/∂m1 = a2 and p = B0
1 from the quota
trading equilibrium in Stage 3, and B0
1/(1+m2) = D0
1 from Stage 2 where m1/(1+m1) =























(1 + m1)2 < 0
The increase in country 1’s matching rate will reduce its net beneﬁt.
If country 1 were to reduce m1, starting with m1m2 = 1 and overlapping reaction curves,
its reaction curve would move outside that of country 2 and both reaction curves would
remain parallel. The Stage 2 equilibrium would be such that a1 > 0 and a2 = 0, with
A = (1 + m2)a1. Moreover, as shown above, a change in m1 leaves unchanged the a1-
intercept of country 1’s reaction curve. As a result, the reduction in m1 by country 1
would have no eﬀect on either countries’ total abatements or net beneﬁts.
This demonstration also holds for a change in country 2’s matching rate. Therefore, when
m1m2 = 1 and reaction curves coincide, neither country has any incentive to change its
matching rate and the allocation is an equilibrium.
The Multi-Country Case
Start by examining how changes in one country’s matching rates aﬀect all countries’ reac-














































(> 0 at ai = 0)
For expositional convenience, consider the case of three countries. Suppose that matching
rates satisfy mijmji = 1 and mkimij = mkj, for i,j,k = 1,2,3, and that reaction functions
coincide. Figure 2 depicts the countries’ reaction functions. They coincide in the interior
and correspond to the triangle PQS. Analogously to the two-country case with quota
trading, reaction functions are parallel planes in the interior for any set of matching rates.
If matching rates are such that reaction functions do not coincide, the country with the
reaction function that is furthest from the origin will be the only one to undertake direct
abatement, which will equal the own-axis intercept of its reaction function.
33Starting with matching rates for which mijmji = 1 and mkimij = mkj and reaction func-
tions coincide, suppose country 1 increases one of its matching rates, say m12. For coun-
try 1’s reaction function, da1/da2|F 1=0 increases and da1/da3|F 1=0 remains unchanged;
da1/dm12|F 1=0 = 0 at a2 = 0, so the segment PS in Figure 2 remains part of country 1’s
reaction function. Thus, country 1’s new reaction function will move to a position such
as PQ00S in the interior. For country 2, da2/da1|F 2=0 and da2/da3|F 2=0 both decrease;
da2/dm12|F 2=0 > 0 at a2 = 0, so country 2’s reaction function shift outwards from seg-
ment PS. The own-axis intercept of country 2’s reaction function may increase or decrease.
Thus, country 2’s new reaction function will move to a position such as P0QS0 or P0 e QS0
in the interior. Finally, for country 3, da3/da2|F 3=0 increases and da3/da1|F 3=0 remains
unchanged; da3/dm12|F 3=0 = 0 at a2 = 0, so the segment PS is still part of the reaction
function. In fact, country 3’s new reaction function continues to coincide with that of
country 1, at a position such as PQ00S. Overall, the increase in m12 results in country 2’s
reaction function moving above those of countries 1 and 3, while all three remain parallel.
The new Stage 2 equilibrium will be at country 2’s new a2-intercept where a1 = a3 = 0.
Note that if country 1 were to increase m13 as well, reaction functions would shift in an
analogous fashion. In this case, the country for which the reaction function would shift
out the furthest (i.e. the one that would face the largest matching rate increase) would be
the country undertaking direct abatements in the subsequent Stage 2 equilibrium.
Suppose now that country 1 decreases m12. The eﬀects on the countries’ reaction functions
would be the opposite to those described above. The reaction functions of countries 1 and
3 would continue to coincide and would move to a position such as PQ0S, while country
2’s reaction function would move to a position such as either P00 e QS00 or P00QS00. The
new Stage 2 equilibrium could be anywhere on segment PS, along which a2 = 0 and the
abatements and net beneﬁts of each country are the same as before the change in m12.
If country 1 were to reduce m13 as well, then the reaction functions of countries 2 and
3 would move everywhere below country 1’s reaction function. The Stage 2 equilibrium
would be at the a1-intercept of country 1’s reaction function where the abatements and
net beneﬁts of all countries remain unchanged.
34Finally, if country 1 were to increase one matching rate, say m12, and reduce the other,
m13, country 2’s reaction function would move everywhere above that of country 1 while
country 3’s reaction function would move everywhere below. The Stage 2 equilibrium
would move to the new a2-intercept of country 2’s reaction function with a1 = a3 = 0.
As in the two-country case, no country can make itself better oﬀ by changing any matching
rate when reaction functions coincide. To see this in the n-country case, note ﬁrst that
the Stage 2 equilibrium is indeterminate when mijmji = 1 and mkimij = mkj. Therefore,
let us characterize the eﬀect of an increase in mik by using as an initial allocation the case
where only country k is making direct abatements, so ak > 0 and ai = 0 for all i = 1,...,n,
i 6= k. As shown in the three-country case, country k will remain the only one making
direct abatements after the increase in mik. In this case, country i’s abatement is mikak






ak. The abatement of country k can





































































































35Therefore, no country would have an incentive to increase its matching rate. Finally, as
shown above for the three-country case, when mijmji = 1 and mkimij = mkj, a reduction
in any country’s matching rate would leave each country’s total abatement and net beneﬁt
unchanged. Hence, the set of matching rates satisfying these conditions constitute an
equilibrium.
Imperfectly Substitutable Emissions
































in general. If K > 0, H will have the same sign as (1−m1m2). Then, as in the basic case
with perfectly substitutable emissions, interior Stage 2 equilibria will be stable if m1m2 < 1
and unstable if m1m2 > 1. In this case, the demonstration that we used earlier, to show
that matching rates for which m1m2 = 1 and Stage 2 reaction curves coincide is the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium in the basic case of Section 3, will also apply with emissions
that are imperfectly substitutable in each country’s damage function. However, if K < 0,
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Figure 1. Stage 2 reaction curves
















Figure 2. Stage 2 reaction curves with three countries
38References
Altemeyer-Bartscher, M., D. R¨ ubbelke and E. Sheshinski (2009), ‘Environmental Protec-
tion and the Private Provision of International Public Goods’, Economica, forthcoming.
Bergstrom, T., L. Blume and H. Varian (1986), ‘On the Private Provision of Public Goods’,
Journal of Public Economics 29, 25–49.
Boadway, R., Z. Song and J.-F. Tremblay (2007), ‘Commitment and Matching Contribu-
tions to Public Goods’, Journal of Public Economics 91, 1664–83.
Danziger, L. and A. Schnytzer (1991), ‘Implementing the Lindahl Voluntary-Exchange
Mechanism’, European Journal of Political Economy 7, 55–64.
Gerber, A. and P.C. Wichardt (2009), ‘Providing Public Goods in the Absence of Strong
Institutions’, Journal of Public Economics 93, 429–39.
Gersbach, H. and R. Winkler (2007), ‘On the Design of Global Refunding and Climate
Change’, Center of Economic Research – ETH Zurich, Working Paper no. 07/69.
Guttman, J. (1978), ‘Understanding Collective Action: Matching Behavior’, American
Economic Review 68, 251–55.
Guttman, J. and A. Schnytzer (1992), ‘A Solution of the Externality Problem Using Strate-
gic Matching’, Social Choice and Welfare 8, 73–88.
Nishimura, Y. (2008), ‘A Lindahl Solution to International Emissions Trading’, Working
Paper No. 1177, Department of Economics, Queen’s University.
Roberts, M. J. and M. Spence (1976), ‘Eﬄuent Charges and Licenses Under Uncertainty’,
Journal of Public Economics 5, 193–208.
Sandmo, A. (2006), ‘Global Public Economics: Public Goods and Externalities’, Discussion
Paper No. 32, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen,
Norway.
39Shibata, H. (1971), ‘A Bargaining Model of the Pure Theory of Public Expenditure’,
Journal of Political Economy 79, 1–29.
Varian, H. (1994), ‘Sequential Contributions to Public Goods’, Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 53, 165–86.
Warr, P. (1983), ‘The Private Production of a Public Good is Independent of the Distri-
bution of Income’, Economic Letters 13, 207–11.
40